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Yang Cao, Yonghui Xiao, Li Xiong, Liquan Bai, and Masatoshi Yoshikawa
Abstract—Location privacy-preserving mechanisms (LPPMs) have been extensively studied for protecting users’ location privacy by
releasing a perturbed location to third parties such as location-based service providers. However, when a user’s perturbed locations
are released continuously, existing LPPMs may not protect the sensitive information about the user’s spatiotemporal activities, such as
“visited hospital in the last week” or “regularly commuting between Address 1 and Address 2” (it is easy to infer that Addresses 1 and 2
may be home and office), which we call it spatiotemporal event. In this paper, we first formally define spatiotemporal event as Boolean
expressions between location and time predicates, and then we define -spatiotemporal event privacy by extending the notion of
differential privacy. Second, to understand how much spatiotemporal event privacy that existing LPPMs can provide, we design
computationally efficient algorithms to quantify the privacy leakage of state-of-the-art LPPMs when an adversary has prior knowledge
of the user’s initial probability over possible locations. It turns out that the existing LPPMs cannot adequately protect spatiotemporal
event privacy. Third, we propose a framework, PriSTE, to transform an existing LPPM into one protecting spatiotemporal event privacy
against adversaries with any prior knowledge. Our experiments on real-life and synthetic data verified that the proposed method is
effective and efficient.
Index Terms—Location Privacy, Spatiotemporal Event, Markov Model, Location-based Service.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
The continued advances and usage of smartphones and
GPS-enabled devices have provided tremendous opportuni-
ties for Location-Based Service (LBS), such as Yelp or Uber
for snapshot or continuous queries, for example, “where
is the nearest restaurant” or “continuously report the taxis
within one mile of my location”. Mobile users have to share
their real-time location, or a sequence of locations with
the service providers, which raises privacy concerns since
users’ digital trace can be used to infer sensitive information,
such as home and workplace, religious places and sexual
inclinations [2] [3] [4].
A large number of studies (see surveys [5] [6] [7])
have explored how to protect user’s location privacy which
can be categorized from different aspects: privacy goals,
adversarial models, location privacy metrics, and location
privacy preserving mechanisms (LPPMs). Privacy goals in-
dicate what should be protected or what are the secrets
(e.g., a single location or a trajectory); adversarial models
make assumptions about the adversaries; location privacy
metrics formally define the quantitative measurement of
the protection w.r.t. the privacy goal; LPPMs is designed
to achieve a specified privacy metric. For instance, Geo-
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Indistinguishability [8] is a location privacty metrics, which
is receiving increasing attention since it extends the notion
of differential privacy [9] to the location privacy setting so
that the protection level does not depend on adversaries’
prior knowledge; the privacy goal of Geo-Indistinguish-
ability is to protect a single location (can be extended for
protecting location trace [10]); Laplace Planar Mechanism
[8] is an LPPM satisfying Geo-Indistinguishability. Another
example is Planar Isotropic Mechanism [11] for the metrics
of δ-location set privacy to protect each location in a trajec-
tory. These state-of-the-art LPPMs take an actual location
and a privacy parameter as inputs and probabilistically
output a randomly perturbed location. A LPPM privacy
parameter controls the location privacy level. For examples
of the above mechanisms, the privacy parameter is dened
as a positive real value and a smaller privacy parameter
indicates stronger privacy protection. In other words, the
privacy parameter can be considered as the controlled level
of privacy loss.
We argue that the existing state-of-the-art LPPMs may
not adequately protect users’ sensitive information in their
spatiotemporal activities because the privacy goal is not well-
studied. The existing LPPMs focused on the protection of
either a single location or a trajectory, which does not
completely reflect the secrets that should be protected in
users’ spatiotemporal activities. To explain this, we need
to define “spatiotemporal activities”. We define a user’s a
single location at time t as a predicate lt = si where lt
is a variable representing the user’s position at time t and
si ∈ S, i ∈ [1,m] is a location on the map S of m locations.
The value of such predicate can be either true or false,
which could be a secret of the user. Then, we can represent
users’ spatiotemporal activities as Boolean expressions of
combining different predicates over spatial and/or temporal
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(c) (l1 = s1) ^ (l2 = s1)
(d) (l1 = s1) _ (l2 = s1)
(e) ((l1 = s1) _ (l1 = s2))
^((l2 = s1) _ (l2 = s2))
(f) ((l1 = s1) _ (l1 = s2))
_((l2 = s1) _ (l2 = s2))
(a) (l1 = s1) ^ (l1 = s2)
(b) (l1 = s1) _ (l1 = s2)
Fig. 1: Six examples of spatiotemporal events. Event (a) is
always false. Event (b) represents a sensitive region. Event
(c) represents a sensitive trajectory. Event (d) represents the
presence or not in a sensitive location. Event (e) indicates
a mobility pattern passing through sensitive regions. Event
(f) indicates the presence or not in a sensitive region.
dimensions, which is called spatiotemporal event in this paper.
In Fig.1, we illustrate six representative Boolean expres-
sions between location and time dimensions. We use s1 and
s2 to denote two locations on the map S, and use l1 and l2 to
denote two variables about a user’s locations at timestamps
1 and 2, respectively. Event (a) is always false since a user
cannot be physically at two different locations at the same
time. Event (b) means that the secret is a sensitive region (or
area) of {s1, s2}. Event (c) represents a sensitive trajectory
s1 → s1 between timestamps 1 and 2, i.e., the user stays at
s1 at time 1 and time 2. Event (d) denotes that the secret
is the visit to s1 at timestamp 1 or 2. Event (e) depicts the
secret as a type of trajectory pattern, i.e., the user may stay
at two sensitive regions successively; a real-world example
of such event is “regularly commuting between Address 1
and Address 2 every morning and every afternoon”, i.e.,
periodic spatiotemporal events may happen every week
day. Event (f) indicates the secret as user’s presence in
sensitive region {s1, s2} at either timestamp 1 or 2; a real-
world example of such event is “visited hospital in the last
week”, i.e., the hospital visit may happen once or multiple
times at any time in last week.
We can see that the spatiotemporal events representing
sensitive locations and a trajectory (i.e., (b) and (c)), which
are the major privacy goals of existing LPPMs, are only two
cases among the six enumerated examples. Hence, even if
an LPPM protects each location or a trajectory, it may not
protect a complex spatiotemporal event such as the ones
shown in Fig.1 (e) and (f) since such new privacy goals have
not been formalized in the literature.
There are three challenges in protecting such a new pri-
vacy goal. First, we lack the formal definition of spatiotem-
poral event and privacy metrics for it. Second, evaluating
the privacy guarantee of a given spatiotemporal event could
be computationally intractable since the event can be ex-
tremely complicated. Taking the pattern event (e.g., Fig.3(f))
for example, if the sensitive region includes m locations and
the length of such event spans T timestamps, there are mT
possible trajectories that need to be protected, which may
lead to exponential time computation. Third, similar to Geo-
Indistinguishability, we hope to design a mechanism that is
robust to adversaries with any prior knowledge.
Contributions. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first paper that studies how to protect spatiotemporal event
privacy. Our contributions are summarized as follows.
First, we study the privacy goal and privacy metric for
protecting spatiotemporal event (Section 2). We formally de-
fine a new type of privacy goal, i.e., spatiotemporal events,
as Boolean expressions of location-time predicates, and
propose a privacy metric, -spatiotemporal event privacy, for
protecting spatiotemporal events by extending the notion of
differential privacy. We also explore the difference between
the metrics of location privacy and spatiotemporal event
privacy. It turns out that, although the definition of spa-
tiotemporal event is more general than a single location or a
trajectory, the privacy metrics between spatiotemporal event
privacy and location privacy can be orthogonal. Hence, it
would be preferable that an LPPM achieving a location
privacy metric such as Geo-indistinguishability can also
satisfy -spatiotemporal event privacy w.r.t. user-specified
events. Location privacy provides general protection against
unknown risks, while spatiotemporal event privacy guaran-
tees flexible and customizable protection which may not be
provided by the existing LPPMs.
Second, we develop efficient algorithms for quantifying
how much -spatiotemporal event privacy a given LPPM
can provide w.r.t. adversaries with a specific prior knowl-
edge about the user’s initial probability distribution over
possible locations (Section 3). We model an LPPM as an
emission matrix that takes user’s true position as input and
outputs a perturbed location. As we mentioned previously,
one of the challenges in quantifying the probability of a spa-
tiotemporal event is that the computational complexity may
be exponentially increasing with the number of predicates in
a user-specified spatiotemporal event. We develop a novel
two-possible-world method to quantify spatiotemporal event
privacy with linear complexity.
Third, based on our quantification method, we propose
a framework, i.e, PriSTE (Private Spatio-Temporal Event),
which converts a mechanism for location privacy into one
for spatiotemporal event privacy against adversaries with
any prior knowledge (Section 4). We demonstrate the effec-
tiveness of our framework by two case studies using state-
of-the-art LPPMs, i.e., Laplace Planar Mechanism for Geo-
indistinguishability [8] and Planar Isotropic Mechanism for
δ-location set privacy [11].
Finally, we evaluate our algorithms on both synthetic
and real-world datasets testing its feasibility, efficiency, and
the impact of various parameters (Section 5).
2 DEFINING SPATIOTEMPORAL EVENT PRIVACY
2.1 Scenario
We consider a scenario that a single user continuously re-
leases her perturbed location with an untrusted third party
such as location-based service provider. The user’s true
locations are denoted by l1, l2, · · · , lT . A location privacy-
preserving mechanism (LPPM) blurs user’s true location lt
to a perturbed one ot that satisfies a privacy metric such
as Geo-Indistinguishability [8] or δ-location set privacy [11].
Essentially, the LPPM is an emission matrix that takes user’s
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Spatiotemporal Event Boolean Expression Interpretation (if the event is true)
single location event lt = si visited the location si at time t
PRESENCE at a single location (l1 = si) ∨ (l2 = si) ∨ · · · ∨ (lT = si) visited a location si during time {1, 2, · · · , T}
single region event (lt = si) ∨ (lt = sj) ∨ · · · ∨ (lt = sk) visited a region s = {si, · · · , sk} at time t
single trajectory event (l1 = si) ∧ (l2 = sj) ∧ · · · ∧ (lT = sk) visited specified locations successively during time {1, 2, · · · , T}
PATTERN of trajectories ((l1 = si) ∨ (l1 = sj) ∨ · · · ∨ (l1 = sk)) ∧ · · ·∧((lT = sl) ∨ (lT = sm) ∨ · · · ∨ (lT = sn)) visited specified regions successively during time {1, 2, · · · , T}
TABLE 1: Representative examples of EVENTS of Boolean operations on the (location, time) predicates.
true location as input and outputs a perturbed one. The
major notations in this paper are summarized in Table 2.
m the amount of all possible locations on the map
s a vector representing a region, s ∈ {0, 1}m×1
t a timestamp in {1, 2, · · · , T}
S a sequence of regions
T a sequence of timestamps
lt a user’s true location at time t
ot a user’s perturbed location at time t
EVENT a spatiotemporal event
p˜ot a vector of emission probabilities given the obser-
vation ot.
p˜Dot a diagonal matrix with the vector p˜ot on the
diagonal.
TABLE 2: Notations.
2.2 Spatiotemporal Events
We fist define location-time predicate, which is an atomic
element in spatiotemporal events. Let S = {s1, · · · , sm}
be the domain of all possible locations, where m is the
size of the domain and si is one location (we use state
interchangeably) on the map. At time t, a user’s location
can be stated as lt = si, which means the user is at location
si at time t. We call lt = si location-time predicate, whose
value can be true or false depending on the ground truth of
user’s state at t.
We define spatiotemporal events as Boolean expressions
of the location-time predicates.
Definition 2.1 (EVENT). A spatiotemporal event, denoted by
EVENT, is a single location-time predicate or a combination of
location-time predicates linked by the Boolean operators AND,
OR, NOT (i.e., ∧, ∨, ¬, respectively).
Using Boolean logic to define spatiotemporal events
enables users to customize their privacy preference for
diverse real-world activities. Table 1 shows some repre-
sentative examples of EVENT. For example, an event of a
single location can be represented by a predicate alone,
i.e., lt = si; a single trajectory event can be denoted by
(l1 = si) ∧ (l2 = sj) ∧ · · · ,∧(lT = sk), which is true if the
user passes through si, sj , · · · , sk during time 1 to T .
For the ease of exposition, we define the following nota-
tions. We denote a region (i.e., a set of locations) by a vector
s ∈ {0, 1}m×1 where the ith element is 1 only if the region
contains si. We use S to indicate a sequence of regions. We
denote the corresponding timestamp of each region by T
as a sequence of timestamps with the same cardinality of
S . A pair of i-th elements in S and T could form a single
region event as shown in Table 1 (or Event (b) in Fig. 1).
s1
s2
s3
1 time2 3 4 5 6
sensitive regions
locations
Fig. 2: We show two events, i.e., PRESENCE(S, T ) and PAT-
TERN(S, T ). If the user’s ground truth trajectory is the black
one, only PRESENCE(S, T ) is true; if the user’s trajectory is
the blue one, both events are true; if the user’s trajectory is
the red one, both events are false.
These single region events could be combined by AND or
OR, which form PRESENCE or PATTERN (see the difference
between Events (e) and (f) in Fig. 1).
2.2.1 PRESENCE Event
When the secret is whether or not a user visited a sensitive
region (e.g., medical facilities) in a given time period, we can
use PRESENCE to represent such secret. A PRESENCE event
holds if a user appears in any one of the regions with user-
specified timestamps. In the simplest case of PRESENCE,
when the region includes only one location and the time
period consists of one timestamp, it reduces to a single
location event shown in Table 1. Hence, PRESENCE event can
be seen as a generalization of single location event.
Definition 2.2 (PRESENCE). Given a sequence of regions S =
[s1, · · · , sn] and a sequence of timestamps T = [t1, · · · , tn], if
a user appears in at least one sk ∈ S at the corresponding time
tk ∈ T ,then it is a presence event, denoted by PRESENCE(S, T ).
Example 2.1 (Example of PRESENCE). Figure 2 shows a map
of S = {s1, s2, s3}. For this event, the region s = [1, 1, 0]ᵀ
denoting the states s1 and s2; the time period T = [3, 4] denoting
timestamp 3 and 4. Let S = [s, s]. This PRESENCE (S, T ) event
is expressed as (l3 = s1) ∨ (l3 = s2) ∨ (l4 = s1) ∨ (l4 =
s2). The shaded region shows a PRESENCE event that the user
appears in a region of {s1, s2} during timestamps 3 and 4. If the
user’s true trajectory passes through the shaded region (at least
one timestamp), the event is true.
2.2.2 PATTERN Event
We use PATTERN to represent the secret whether or not
a user visited multiple sensitive regions successively. In a
simple case of PATTERN event, the regions consist of single
locations at a sequence of timestamps, then it is reduced to
single trajectory event shown in Table 1. Hence, PATTERN is a
generalization of a user’s trajectories.
Definition 2.3 (PATTERN). Given a sequence of regions S =
[s1, · · · , sn] and a sequence of timestamps T = [t1, · · · , tn],
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if a user appears in all {s1, · · · , sn} sequentially at the corre-
sponding time during T , then it is a pattern event, denoted by
PATTERN(S, T ).
Example 2.2 (Example of PATTERN). The PATTERN event
in Fig. 2 represents trajectories with a pattern going through
a sensitive region {s1, s2} at timestamp 2 and the same region
{s1, s2} at timestamp 3 successively. This PATTERN event is
expressed as ((l2 = s1) ∨ (l2 = s2)) ∧ ((l3 = s1) ∨ (l3 = s2)).
2.2.3 Remarks
From the above definitions, we can see that, in terms of
privacy goal, spatiotemporal event privacy can be a gen-
eralization of location privacy studied in the literature in
which the privacy goal is protecting a single location or a
trajectory. In this paper, we focus on the two representative
events defined above, i.e., PRESENCE and PATTERN, which
are the two most complicated and unexplored events among
examples in Fig.1. We note that PRESENCE and PATTERN
include the cases when the time T is not consecutive. Users
can specify one or multiple spatiotemporal events to be
protected. We propose a privacy metric for preserving user’s
indistinguishability of her specified spatiotemporal events
in the next section.
2.3 -Spatiotemporal Event Privacy
Inspired by the definition of differential privacy [9], we
define -Spatiotemporal Event Privacy as follows.
Definition 2.4 (-Spatiotemporal Event Privacy). A mecha-
nism preserves -Spatiotemporal Event Privacy for a spatiotem-
poral EVENT if at any timestamp t in {1, · · · , T} given any
observations {o1, · · · , ot},
Pr(o1, · · · , ot|EVENT) ≤ e Pr(o1, · · · , ot|¬EVENT) (1)
where EVENT is a logic variable about the user-specified spa-
tiotemporal event and ¬EVENT denotes the negation of EVENT.
Pr(o1, o2, · · · , ot|EVENT) denotes the probability of the observa-
tions o1, o2, · · · , ot given the value of EVENT.
There are two major benefits of extending differential
privacy to protecting spatiotemporal events. First, it pro-
vides a well-defined semantics for spatiotemporal event
privacy. Similar to differential privacy that requires the
indistinguishability between any two neighboring databases
[9], -Spatiotemporal Event Privacy requires the indistin-
guishability regarding whether the EVENT is true or false
given any observations. It provides a clear privacy seman-
tics: it is hard for adversaries to distinguish whether the
event happened or not. Another benefit is that, similar to
differential privacy whose privacy guarantee is independent
of the prior probability of a given database, the privacy
provided by -Spatiotemporal Event Privacy is independent
of the prior probability of the protected event.
To better understand the characteristics of spatiotem-
poral event privacy, we illustrate the indistinguishability-
based privacy metrics for the three privacy goals in Fig.3,
where the lines connecting two secrets indicate the require-
ments of indistinguishability between the corresponding
two possible values of the secrets.
As shown in Fig.3 (a), indistinguishability-based loca-
tion privacy metrics (such as geo-indistinguishability [8])
require indistinguishability between each pair of locations.
(a) indistinguishability-based
Location Privacy
(b) indistinguishability-based
Trajectory Privacy
(c) ε-Spatiotemporal Event Privacy
s1
s2 s3
s1 ! s1
s1 ! s2
s1 ! s3
s2 ! s1
s2 ! s2s2 ! s3
s3 ! s1
s3 ! s2
s3 ! s3
s1 ! s1
s1 ! s2
s1 ! s3
s2 ! s2
s2 ! s3
s3 ! s1
s3 ! s2
s2 ! s1
s3 ! s3
Fig. 3: Illustration of indistinguishability-based privacy met-
rics for distinct privacy goals when S = {s1, s2, s3} and T = 2.
Indistinguishability-based trajectory privacy metrics [10]
[11] [12] requires indistinguishability between each pair
of possible trajectories as shown in Fig.3 (b). Whereas, -
spatiotemporal event privacy requires indistinguishability
between the defined event and its negation. For example,
if the spatiotemporal event is defined as PATTERN(S, T )
where S = [s1, s2], s1 = {s1}, s2 = {s1, s2, s3} and
T = [1, 2] (i.e., a trajectory passes through s1 and then a
region {s1, s2, s3} successively), then it only requires the
indistinguishability between the set of all possible trajecto-
ries that pass through {s1} and {s1, s2, s3} and the set of
trajectories that do not. This spatiotemporal event privacy
makes sense when some mobility patterns are sensitive. For
example, if s1 is “hospital”, s2 is “home”, and s3 is “office”,
the pattern from s1 to {s1, s2, s3} could be sensitive.
We note that spatiotemporal event privacy is orthogonal
to location privacy or trajectory privacy. First, protecting
the privacy of a single location or a trajectory may not im-
ply the protection of spatiotemporal event privacy because
spatiotemporal event can be complex as shown in Fig.1(e)
or (f). The existing LPPMs are designed to ensure privacy
metrics defined on locations or trajectories. One of our focus
in this study is to quantify how much spatiotemporal event
privacy a given LPPM can provide, which will be elaborated
in the next section. Second, protecting spatiotemporal event
privacy does not imply the protection of location privacy
because they define indistinguishability over different level
of secrets. Taking Fig. 3(c) for example, the indistinguisha-
bility between s1 → s1 and s1 → s2 is not required in
such spatiotemporal event privacy guarantee; however, it is
required in trajectory privacy as shown in Fig. 3(b). Even
if we define the event in spatiotemporal event privacy as
a single location, say s1, the guarantee of spatiotemporal
event privacy is the indistinguishability between s1 and
{s2, s3}, which does not guarantee the indistinguishability
between s1 and s2.
It would be preferable if we achieve both location pri-
vacy and spatiotemporal event privacy so that a user can
enjoy the best of two worlds: Location privacy provides
general protection against unknown risks when sharing
location with the third parties, while spatiotemporal event
privacy guarantees customizable protection which may pre-
vent against profiling attacks [3] [13]. Therefore, in this
paper, we study how to use an existing probabilistic LPPM
(e.g., Laplace Planar Mechanism [8] and Planar Isotropic
Mechanism [11]) to achieve -spatiotemporal event privacy.
We note that the definition of events may reveal a
user’s sensitive information. In this paper, we assume that
the events and the protection mechanisms are locally and
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s1 s2 s3
s1 0.5 0.3 0.2
s2 0.1 0.8 0.1
s3 0.2 0.2 0.6
(a) Emission Matrix 
perturbed location ot
tru
e 
loc
  l t
Pr(ot | lt)
s1 s2 s3
s1 0.1 0.2 0.7
s2 0 0 1
s3 0.3 0.3 0.4
(b) Transition Matrix 
  lt+1
 l t
Pr(lt+1 | lt)
Fig. 4: Illustration of emission matrix and transition matrix.
securely stored in the user’s device. The user may specify
one or multiple events that need to be protected. In practice,
we can also have default that are suggested by a privacy
preference recommendation system for users’ selection [14]
or pre-specified event templates that are given by the user.
3 QUANTIFYING SPATIOTEMPORAL EVENT PRI-
VACY
3.1 Overview of our approach
We first clarify our assumptions about LPPM, transition
matrix and user’s initial probability distribution of each
location as follows. First, we consider an LPPM that takes
input as user’s true location lt and outputs a perturbed
location ot at time t. We use an m × m emission matrix
(as shown in Fig.4(a)) to represent the LPPM. Second, we
assume a user’s location at time t+1 are correlated with her
location at time t, representing by anm×m transition matrix
as shown in Fig.4(b), and such transition matrix is public
information which can be learned from either historical
trajectory or the pattern of road networks. We model the
correlation between user’s consecutive locations using first-
order1 time-homogeneous2 Markov model, i.e., the transi-
tion matrix is identical at each t. The transition matrix is
given in our system. Third, for ease of exposition, we first
assume that adversaries who have a specific knowledge
of the user’s initial probability distribution over possible
locations, which is denoted by pi; in the next section, we will
remove this assumption so that the spatiotemporal event
privacy leakage will be bounded in  w.r.t. adversaries with
any prior knowledge of user’s initial probability.
Now, we explain the main goal of quantifying the
spatiotemporal event privacy leakage of the LPPM and
our approach. Based on Definition 2.4 of -spatiotemporal
event privacy, we need to calculate the maximum ratio of
Pr(o1,o2,··· ,oT |EVENT)
Pr(o1,o2,··· ,oT |¬EVENT) in which o1, o2, · · · , oT are released by
a given LPPM. This ratio can be considered as spatiotempo-
ral event privacy leakage w.r.t. the user-specified event. We
quantify this ratio w.r.t. given observations o1, o2, · · · , oT
and a given user’s initial probability pi, so that we can
directly calculate the Pr(o1, o2, · · · , oT |EVENT). In Section
4, we will design a mechanism for spatiotemporal event
1. If the Markov model is high-ordered, i.e., the transition matrix has
a larger state domain, our approach still works.
2. If the Markov model is time-varying, i.e., transition matrices at
different t are not identical, our approach still works. We explain this
in the next section.
privacy w.r.t. any observations and arbitrary initial prob-
ability. Our goal in this section is to calculate the like-
lihood of the observations given EVENT or ¬EVENT , i.e.,
Pr(o1, o2, · · · , oT |EVENT) or Pr(o1, o2, · · · , oT |¬EVENT), which can
be derived by Pr(o1, o2, · · · , oT |EVENT) = Pr(o1,o2,··· ,oT ,EVENT)Pr(EVENT) .
We call Pr(EVENT) as prior probability of the event, and
Pr(o1, o2, · · · , oT , EVENT) as joint probability of the event.
A severe challenge of calculating the prior or joint prob-
abilities of the event is the computational complexity. Given
an arbitrary spatiotemporal event, we need to enumerate
all possible combination of the Boolean expression for prior
and joint probabilities, which can be exponential to the num-
ber of predicates in the expression. To address this problem,
we propose a two-possible-world method for computing the
prior and joint probabilities in Sections 3.2 and 3.3.
For ease of exposition, we define notations below. M ∈
Rm×m denotes a transition matrix that describes temporal
correlations in user’s location. At timestamp 1, an initial
probability is denoted by pi ∈ [0, 1]1×m. During timestamp
{1, 2, · · · , T}, the probability of the true location Pr(lt) is
denoted by a row vector pt ∈ [0, 1]1×m where the ith element
denotes Pr(lt = si). A Markov model follows the transition
property of pt+1 = ptM, e.g., after a Markov transition,
p2 = piM at timestamp 2 given p1 = pi.
The notations below for matrix computation are also
used in the rest of this paper. Let 0 and 1 be row vectors
with m elements being 0 and 1 respectively. [0, 1] is a row
vector in R1×2m. a ◦ b denotes the Hadamard product of a
and b. aD is a diagonal matrix with the elements of vector a
on the diagonal.
3.2 Computing Prior Probability of an Event
To avoid the exponential complexity, we propose an efficient
algorithm with two possible worlds. The idea is to elaborate
a “new” transition matrix Mt ∈ R2m×2m at each time t
which encodes the complex spatiotemporal event inside, so
that the calculation of the prior or joint probability for a
complicated event is the same as one simple predicate.
Intuition. The main idea of our method is to use two
virtual worlds denoting whether the EVENT is true or false.
The states in the two worlds denote the joint probabil-
ities Pr(lt = si, EVENT) and Pr(lt = si,¬EVENT). For
PRESENCE, once a trajectory enters into the region of the
PRESENCE, its probability will be kept in the world of true
EVENT forever. For PATTERN, the probability distribution
among the two worlds are derived at the beginning times-
tamp of the EVENT, and only the trajectories satisfying the
PATTERN will be kept in the world of true EVENT. At last,
the sum of probabilities in the world of true EVENT will be
Pr(EVENT is true).
In the following, we study how to compute the prior
probabilities of PRESENCE and PATTERN events. For sim-
plicity, the events in the rest of the paper are defined in
consecutive time and use start and end to denote the
start time point and end time point of the user-specified
spatiotemporal event. We assume S to be {s1, s2, s3} in the
following examples.
3.2.1 Presence Events
Example 3.1. Let us consider the same PRESENCE event defined
in Example 2.1, It is defined as an event passing through s1 or s2
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during t = 3 or t = 4, i.e., s = [1, 1, 0]ᵀ, start = 3, end = 4.
The transition matrix M is given below.
M =
 0.1 0.2 0.70.4 0.1 0.5
0 0.1 0.9
 (2)
Then Fig.5 shows the new transitions in the two worlds, the
top world and the bottom world separated by the dashed line in
Fig.5, corresponding to the two possible worlds where the presence
event is false or true respectively. From time 1 to 2, a normal
transition can be made. At timestamp 2, all the transitions going
to the states s1 and s2 will be re-directed to the new states s′1
and s′2, denoting the states when the PRESENCE happens. Other
transitions that do not go to the region will be performed normally.
Similarly at time 3, the transition from s3 to s2 will also go to the
state s′2 because the event is also true in this case. After time 4,
the original Markov transitions come back to work again.
s1
s2
s3
1 time2 3 4 5 6
Presence
s
0
1
s
0
2
s
0
3
Presence
is true
Presence
is false
Fig. 5: New Markov transitions: all transitions going to the
PRESENCE region will be re-directed to the virtual worlds.
The intuition can be formalized as follows. First, the orig-
inal probabilities in R1×m is extended to R1×2m. Thus the
initial probability pi becomes [pi, 0]. Second, the transition
matrix Mt takes the form of four transition matrices between
the two virtual worlds, i.e. the EVENT is true or false, in
Equation (3). Then the new transition matrix can be derived
in Equations (4) and (5) for different time period where M is
the original transition matrix and sD is the diagonal of the
region s of PRESENCE defined in Definition 2.2.
Mt =
[
false→ false false→ true
true→ false true→ true
]
on the event. (3)
Mt =
[
M−MsD MsD
0D M
]
, start− 1 ≤ t ≤ end− 1. (4)
Mt =
[
M 0D
0D M
]
, t < start− 1 or t ≥ end. (5)
Equation (4), designed to capture and maintain all the
transitions going to the region of the PRESENCE, is the new
transition matrix when entering (and inside) the event time.
Equation (5), designed to keep the original transitions in
the two virtual worlds, is the new transition matrix when
leaving (and before) the event time. Third, at the last time
T , the probability of the PRESENCE will be the sum of all
probabilities in the bottom world (where PRESENCE is true).
3.2.2 Pattern Events
For PATTERN events, the bottom world denoting the event
is true only needs to preserve the transitions going to
the defined regions of the PATTERN event. The following
example shows the mechanism.
Example 3.2. We study the PATTERN event as illustrated in
Fig.6. At time 1, the transitions entering s1 and s2 go to s′1
and s′2. From time 2 to 4, the transitions in the top world were
performed normally. However, the transitions from the bottom
world go back to the top world if the destinations are not in the
defined regions. At time 5, the original Markov transitions come
back to work again.
s1
s2
s3
1 time2 3 4 5 6
Pattern
s
0
1
s
0
2
s
0
3
Pattern
is true
Pattern
is false
Fig. 6: New Markov transitions: at timestamp 1, all transitions
going to the defined region will be re-directed to the bottom
world; at timestamp 2 ∼ 4, only the transitions from the bottom
world to the defined regions remain below.
From above example, the transition matrices for PAT-
TERN differ from the ones for PRESENCE during the event
time from start to end − 1 (i.e., Equation (7)). On the other
hand, when it is outside the event, i.e., t < start− 1 or t ≥
end, the transition matrices for PATTERN are the same as the
ones for PRESENCE (i.e., the matrices in (8) and (5) are the
same). Finally, when t = start − 1, the transition matrices
for PATTERN is also as same as the ones for PRESENCE (i.e.,
the matrices in (6) and (4) are identical).
Mt =
[
M−MsD MsD
0D M
]
, t = start− 1. (6)
Mt =
[
M 0D
M−MsDt MsDt
]
, start ≤ t ≤ end− 1. (7)
Mt =
[
M 0D
0D M
]
, t < start− 1 or t ≥ end. (8)
In summary, the prior probability of any EVENT can be
derived as the sum of probabilities in the world where the
EVENT is true. Lemma 3.1 shows the formal computation.
Lemma 3.1. For initial probability pi ∈ R1×m, the prior proba-
bility of an EVENT of PRESENCE and PATTERN is
Pr(EVENT) = [pi, 0]
end−1∏
i=1
Mi[0, 1]ᵀ (9)
where Mi is computed by Equations (4), (5), (6), (7), (8).
If the Markov model is time-varying, i.e. when the
transition matrices M at different t are not identical, the
only extra effort is to re-compute Equations (4)∼(8) using
the corresponding transition matrix M at t.
3.3 Computing Joint Probability of an Event
The calculation of a spatiotemporal event and a sequence of
observed locations, i.e, Pr(o1, o2, · · · , oT , EVENT) is a little
JOURNAL OF LATEX CLASS FILES, VOL. XX, NO. X, AUGUST 201X 7
more complicated than previous sections since it depends
on not only the initial probabilities but also the emission
matrix of the LPPM. Similarly, we use two-possible-world
method to avoid enumerating all possible cases of an event.
We utilize forward-backward algorithm [15] to estimate the
probability of the true state (true location) at timestamp t
given all observations Pr(lt|o1, o2, · · · , oT ). It first calculates
a forward probability αkt = Pr(lt = sk, o1, o2, · · · , ot)
iteratively, i.e.,
αkt = Pr(ot|lt = sk)
∑
i
αit−1Pr(lt = sk|lt−1 = si). (10)
Then, a backward probability βkt =
Pr(ot+1, ot+2, · · · , oT |lt = sk) can also be derived by
βkt =
∑
i
Pr(lt+1 = si|lt = sk)Pr(ot+1|lt+1 = si)βit+1. (11)
By initializing βkT = 1 for all k, we can obtain the
estimation of lt as follows.
Pr(lt = sk|o1, o2, · · · , oT ) = α
k
t β
k
t∑
i α
i
tβ
i
t
(12)
Intuition. The intuition of our solution is to use the forward-
backward algorithm in the two virtual worlds where the
EVENT is true and false. This is feasible because the emis-
sion probability, which determines the probabilities of the
observations, is independent from any EVENTS. Hence in
our computation the forward probability and backward
probability are Pr(EVENT, o1, o2, · · · , ot) for t ≤ end and
Pr(oend+1, oend+2, · · · , ot|EVENT) for t > end respectively.
By combining them together, we can obtain the posterior
probability of the EVENT. Note that at any timestamp
t ≤ end, we do not see the future (t > end) observations.
Thus the posterior probability only counts to the current
timestamp t.
Before and During the Event. In the forward algorithm,
the probability αkt = Pr(lt = sk, o1, o2, · · · , ot) is de-
rived at timestamp t. We represent αkt in the vector form
αt = [α
1
1, α
2
t , · · · , αmt ]. Then it can be derived as αt =
(αt−1Mt−1) ◦ p˜ot = αt−1Mt−1p˜Dot . Without any further ob-
servations, the joint probability can be derived from Lemma
3.1. The result is shown in Lemma 3.2.
Lemma 3.2. Given initial probability pi ∈ R1×m, the joint prob-
ability of an EVENT of PRESENCE or PATTERN and observations
o1, o2, · · · , ot at any timestamp t ≤ end is
Pr(EVENT, o1, o2, · · · , ot) = [pi, 0]
p˜Do1 t∏
i=2
(Mi−1p˜
D
oi
)
end−1∏
i=t
Mi[0, 1]
ᵀ

(13)
After the Event. In the backward algorithm, βkt =
Pr(ot+1, ot+2, · · · , oT |lt = sk). We represent it in the vec-
tor form βt = [β1t , β2t , · · · , βmt ]. Then it can be derived as
βt = (βt+1 ◦ p˜ot+1 )M
ᵀ
t = βt+1p˜
D
ot+1
Mᵀt for any t > end.
Similarly, we have Lemma 3.3 for joint probability.
Lemma 3.3. Given initial probability pi ∈ R1×m, the joint prob-
ability of an EVENT of PRESENCE or PATTERN and observations
o1, o2, · · · , ot at any timestamp t > end is
Pr(EVENT, o1, o2, · · · , ot) = [pi, 0](
p˜Do1
end∏
i=2
(Mi−1p˜
D
oi
)
)[1, 1] end∏
i=t−1
(p˜Doi+1M
ᵀ
i ) ◦ [0, 1]
ᵀ (14)
To summarize, now we can quantify the ratio
Pr(o1, o2, · · · , oT |EVENT) = Pr(o1,o2,··· ,oT ,EVENT)Pr(EVENT) for spa-
tiotemporal event privacy using Lemma 3.1 to com-
pute Pr(EVENT) and Lemmas 3.2, 3.3 to compute
Pr(o1, o2, · · · , oT , EVENT). We note that our approach of com-
puting the joint probability of an event is able to deal with
different emission matrices at each t. Since p˜ot is a vector of
emission probabilities given the observation ot, i.e, a column
in the emission matrix, and p˜Dot is a diagonal matrix whose
diagonal elements are p˜ot , we only need to obtain p˜ot and
p˜Dot from the corresponding emission matrix at t, and then
use such p˜Dot in Equations (13) and (14).
4 PRISTE FRAMEWORK
In previous section, we designed methods for quantifying -
spatiotemporal event privacy provided by an LPPM w.r.t. a
specified initial probability, which means that the privacy
loss may not be bounded within  if an attacker has a
different initial probability.
In this section, we first design the PriSTE (Private Spatio-
Temporal Event) framework and then solve the above prob-
lem by checking if -spatiotemporal event privacy for any
initial probabilities. Finally, we demonstrate two case stud-
ies that instantiate the framework based different location
privacy metrics for protecting spatiotemporal event privacy.
4.1 PriSTE
Based on the quantification techniques that we developed in
previous sections, we propose a framework that converts a
location privacy protection mechanism into one protecting
spatiotemporal event privacy. The PriSTE framework is
illustrated in Fig.7 and described in Algorithm 1.
time
Private:
(local)
Public:
LPPM
Quantification
True
Loc. Event
perturbed 
loc.
LPPM
Quantification
True
Loc. Event
perturbed 
loc.
LPPM
Quantification
True
Loc. Event
perturbed 
loc.
  
Fig. 7: PriSTE framework.
The major components are Quantification and a given
LPPM. Their interactions are described as follows. First, the
LPPM generates a perturbed location from the true location
(Line 2 in Algorithm 1) and pass it to the Quantification com-
ponent. By Theorem 4.1, the Quantification component (Line
3) checks whether this perturbed location satisfies the ratio
in Equation (1) (i.e., -spatiotemporal event privacy), under
a sequence of previous observations and user-specified spa-
tiotemporal events. If not, we need to calibrate the emission
matrix to ensure that it satisfies -spatiotemporal event pri-
vacy. The strategy of emission matrix calibration is LPPM-
dependent. In the next section, we demonstrate case studies
of Geo-Indistinguishability [8] and δ-location set privacy
[11], which are the state-of-the-art location privacy metrics.
JOURNAL OF LATEX CLASS FILES, VOL. XX, NO. X, AUGUST 201X 8
Algorithm 1 PriSTE Framework
Require: true location, , LPPM, M, EVENTS
1: for t in {1, 2, · · · , T} do
2: generate ot with LPPM w.r.t. the true location;
3: while -Spatiotemporal Event Privacy not hold do
4: calibrate LPPM and generate ot;
5: end while
6: release ot;
7: end for
4.2 Privacy Checking with Arbitrary Initial Probability
According to the quantification in Section 3, we can calculate
Pr(o1,o2,··· ,oT |EVENT)
Pr(o1,o2,··· ,oT |¬EVENT) given o1, o2, · · · , oT and a given initial
probability pi. In this section, we show how to make sure
the ratio is bounded given arbitrary initial probability.
Our idea to is taking pi as a variable and solving the
maximization problem of Pr(o1,o2,··· ,oT |EVENT)
Pr(o1,o2,··· ,oT |¬EVENT) − e
. We want
to make sure the maximum value is always less than or
equal to 0, i.e., the user enjoys plausible deniability for her
specified spatiotemporal event.
The following theorem shows the conditions related to
pi that satisfies -spatiotemporal event privacy. We will
formulate it as an optimization problem.
Theorem 4.1. For an EVENT of PRESENCE or PAT-
TERN and an arbitrary initial probability pi ∈ R1×m, -
spatiotemporal event privacy is satisfied at any timestamp t, i.e.,
Pr(o1,o2,··· ,oT |EVENT)
Pr(o1,o2,··· ,oT |¬EVENT) ≤ e
, if the observation ot is released based
on the following two conditions
pi
(
[1D, 0D]
(
(e
 − 1)aᵀb− eaᵀc) [1D, 0D]ᵀ)piᵀ + pi[1D, 0D](bᵀ) ≤ 0 (15)
pi
(
[1D, 0D]
(
(e
 − 1)aᵀb+ aᵀc) [1D, 0D]ᵀ)piᵀ − pi[1D, 0D](ebᵀ) ≤ 0 (16)
where
aᵀ =
end−1∏
i=1
Mi[0, 1]ᵀ (17)
For t ≤ end,
bᵀ = p˜Do1
t∏
i=2
(Mi−1p˜Doi )
end−1∏
i=t
Mi[0, 1]ᵀ (18)
cᵀ = p˜Do1
t∏
i=2
(Mi−1p˜Doi )[1, 1]
ᵀ (19)
For t > end,
bᵀ = p˜Do1
end∏
i=2
(Mi−1p˜Doi )
[1, 1] end∏
i=t−1
(p˜Doi+1M
ᵀ
i ) ◦ [0, 1]
ᵀ (20)
cᵀ = p˜Do1
end∏
i=2
(Mi−1p˜Doi )
[1, 1] end∏
i=t−1
(p˜Doi+1M
ᵀ
i ) ◦ [1, 1]
ᵀ (21)
Quadratic Programming. To determine whether Equations
(15) and (16) are true or not for arbitrary pi, we transform
them to maximization problems: finding the maximum val-
ues of the left parts of Equations (15) and (16) under the
constraints of 0 ≤ pi ≤ 1 where pi ∈ pi. As long as
one maximum value is larger than 0, we know that the
LPPM (emission matrix) may not satisfy -spatiotemporal
event privacy. The maximization are equivalent to quadratic
programing problem since they can be rewritten in a form
of piApiᵀ = 1
2
pi(A + Aᵀ)piᵀ where A is a matrix. We
skip the computation details about solving such quadratic
programing problem since many methods and tools have
been proposed in literature. In the experiments, we use IBM
CPLEX optimizer [16] as our computation engine.
4.3 Case Study 1: PriSTE with Geo-indistinguishability
In this section, we instantiate PriSTE framework using α-
Planar Laplace mechanism (α-PLM) which is designed for
Geo-indistinguishability [8]. We first show the computation
details for quantifying -spatiotemporal event privacy by
Theorem 4.1, and then design a greedy strategy for approx-
imately achieving -spatiotemporal event privacy.
Algorithm Design. To implement the quantification
component, we need to (1) compute the internal parameters
a, b and c shown in Theorem 4.1, and (2) design a strategy
to calibrate the emission matrix.
For the calibration strategy for Planar Laplace Mecha-
nism (PLM) with a specified privacy budget α (which solely
determines the shape of the output distribution), we expo-
nentially decay its privacy budget because a smaller privacy
budget implies stronger protection for location privacy and
less information disclosure. In our algorithm, decay rate 12
for the privacy budget in line 10 of Algorithm 2 is a tun-
able parameter that provides a trade-off between efficiency
and utility of the released locations. Setting a small value
allows the algorithm converge faster, but at the cost of over-
perturbing the location at each timestamp. In contrast, using
a large value is less efficient but allows better utility to be
achieved.
A natural question is whether we can always find an α to
release a perturbed location that satisfies Equation (1). The
answer is affirmative because α converges exponentially to
0. When α = 0, it releases no useful information about the
true location, i.e., uniformly returning a random location
without using user’s true position. It is easy to verify that
the Equations (15) and (16) are always true in this situation.
Algorithm 2 shows the computation process. To boost
the efficiency of our algorithm, we use intermediate matrices
A and B to facilitate the computation of b and c. At time
1, we initialize the variables as line 4 ∼ 8. At any time
before and inside the EVENT, we compute the variables
as line 10 ∼ 11. At any timestamps after the EVENT, the
variables are derived as line 13 ∼ 14. Then we use quadratic
programming methods to check Eq.(15) and (16) to decide
whether to release the ot or not. If not, we generate a new ot
with only half α, and repeat the above process again. Finally,
we update the matrices A and B as line 21 ∼ 25. If t = end,
in line 10, the product
∏end−1
i=t Mi will be the identity matrix.
In line 22, M0 is the identity matrix when t = 1. We note that
for multiple EVENTS, Algorithm 2 can be executed multiple
times for each EVENT.
Complexity. The internal parameters a, b and c in Algorithm
2 need O(mT ) time to be evaluated. The major computa-
tional cost lies in the quadratic program for checking Equa-
tions (15) and (16). The complexity will be determined by the
quadratic matrix [1D, 0D]aᵀc[1D, 0D]ᵀ. If it is positive definite,
then the complexity is O(m3). Otherwise, with any negative
eigenvalues, it will be NP-hard [17]. In our experiments, we
use IBM CPLEX which can provide globally optimal results
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Algorithm 2 PriSTE with Geo-indistinguishability.
Require: , EVENT, α-PLM, Mi, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , T}
1: for t in {1, 2, · · · , T} do
2: ot ← α-PLM; . initial budget= α
3: if t == 1 then
4: aᵀ ← ∏end−1i=1 Mi[0, 1]ᵀ
5: A← I . identity matrix
6: B← I
7: bᵀ ← p˜Do1aᵀ
8: cᵀ ← p˜ᵀo1
9: else if t <= end then . before and during EVENT
10: bᵀ ← AMt−1p˜Dot
∏end−1
i=t Mi[0, 1]
ᵀ
11: cᵀ ← AMt−1p˜Dot [1, 1]ᵀ
12: else . after EVENT
13: bᵀ ← A
(
([1, 1]p˜DotM
ᵀ
t−1B) ◦ [0, 1]
)ᵀ
14: cᵀ ← A
(
([1, 1]p˜DotM
ᵀ
t−1B) ◦ [1, 1]
)ᵀ
15: end if
16: if Equations (15) and (16) hold then .  is used
here.
17: release ot; . okay to release ot
18: else
19: α← α2 , goto Line 2; . halve the budget
20: end if
21: if t ≤ end then
22: A← AMt−1p˜Dot . update A by the real ot
23: else
24: B← p˜DotMᵀt−1B . update B by the real ot
25: end if
26: end for
for quadratic program but may need a long computation
time. We use a conservative release strategy to remedy this: we
use a threshold to limit the computation time of quadratic
program for checking Eq.(15) and (16). It will not release a
perturbed location unless the equations are true. Although
it may lead to suboptimal solution in budget calibration,
it always guarantees -spatiotemporal event privacy since
every released locations satisfy Eq.(15) and (16).
Privacy Analysis. PriSTE framework relies on a local model,
i.e., the assumption that adversaries cannot obtain user’s
locally stored information as shown in Fig.7. Although line
2 may be executed more than once at a timestamp t, Algo-
rithm 2 still satisfies α′-geo-indistinguishability where α′ is
the final privacy budget used for releasing ot because that
is the only observation of attacker at time t. If we remove
the assumption of local model, the above statements may
not be true since attacker may observe the internal states of
the algorithm (which is the privacy goal of pan-privacy [18]).
Examples of internal states includes multiple ot tested at t or
the final α′ used in the algorithm. Anothe assumption that
may affect the privacy guarantee is the transition matrix
M, which we use it to model the correlations between
locations and assume that it is given. It is an interesting
future work to quantify the change of privacy loss in terms
of -spatiotemporal event privacy if the ground truth of
correlation is not the modeled one. We defer this study to
future work.
4.4 Case Study 2: PriSTE with δ-Location Set Privacy
To evaluate the effectiveness of PriSTE under different lo-
cation privacy protection mechanisms, we also instantiate
it using another privacy metric δ-location set privacy [11]
[19], which is proposed for obtaining better utility by tak-
ing advantage of temporal correlation between consecutive
locations in user’s trajectory. The key idea is that hiding
the true location in any impossible locations (e.g., whose
probabilities are close to 0) is a lost cause because the
adversary already knows the user cannot be there. In other
words, it restricts the output domain of the emission matrix
to δ-location set, which is a set containing minimum number
of locations that have prior probability sum no less than
1− δ. A larger δ indicates weaker privacy guarantee.
The privacy metrics of α-geo-indistinguishability and
δ-location set privacy are orthogonal because the former
requires a specific “shape” of emission distribution and the
latter restricts output domain of the emission distribution.
In [11], Xiao and Xiong proposed a framework to achieve
δ-location set privacy using a given LPPM. For ease of
comparison, we use α-PLM as the underlying LPPM for δ-
location set privacy.
Algorithm 3 PriSTE with δ-Location Set Privacy.
Require: , EVENT, α-PLM, Mi, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , T}, pi, δ, M.
1: for t in {1, 2, · · · , T} do
2: p−t ← p+t−1M; . Markov transition
3: Construct ∆Xt . δ-location set
4: ot ← α-PLM within ∆Xt;
5: the same as Lines 3 ∼ 15 in Algorithm 2;
6: if Equations (15) and (16) hold then .  is used
here.
7: release ot; . okay to release ot
8: Derive posterior probability p+t by Eq.(22);
9: else
10: α← α2 , goto Line 4; . halve the budget
11: end if
12: the same as Lines 21 ∼ 25 in Algorithm 2;
13: end for
In Line 2, when t = 1, we have p+0 = pi. In Line 8,
according to [11], the posterior probability can be calculated
by Equation (22) where p+t [j] and p
−
t [i] are the ith elements
in the corresponding probability vectors.
p
+
t [i] = Pr(lt = si|ot) =
Pr(ot|lt = si) ∗ p−t [i]∑
j Pr(ot|lt = sj) ∗ p−t [j]
(22)
Hence, we need the initial probability pi in order to cal-
culate δ-location set. In experiments, we set pi to a uniform
distribution for the evaluation of δ-location set privacy. We
note that PriSTE is agnostic to such initial probability since
it guarantees spatiotemporal event privacy against adver-
saries with arbitrary knowledge about the initial probability.
5 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In experiments, we verified that Algorithms 2 and 3 can
adaptively calibrate the privacy budget of Planar Laplace
Mechanism (PLM) at each timestamp for both location
privacy and spatiotemporal event privacy. Especially, we
highlight the following empirical findings.
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• A stricter LPPM can satisfy a certain level of spa-
tiotemporal event privacy without any change (i.e., no
need of privacy budget calibration), whereas a more
loose LPPM may need to reduce its privacy budget
significantly for protecting the same event.
• For achieving the same level of -spatiotemporal
event privacy using different LPPMs, a stricter LPPM
is not always better in terms of data utility.
• If the user’s transition matrix has a significant pat-
tern, an LPPM may need a small privacy budge to
achieve -spatiotemporal event privacy.
5.1 Experiment Settings and Metrics
Dataset. We used real-life and synthetic datasets in exper-
iments. Geolife data [20] was collected from 182 users in
a period of over three years. It recorded a wide range of
users’ outdoor movements, represented by a series of tuples
containing latitude, longitude and timestamp. The user’s
entire trajectory is used to train the transition matrix M, e.g.
with R package “markovchain”.
We generated a synthetic trajectory and its transition
probability matrix as follows. First, a map with 20 ∗ 20 cells
is generated. Then, the transition probability from one cell
to another is drawn from the two-dimensional Gaussian
distribution with scale parameter σ based on the distance
between the cells. Here, a smaller σ indicates that the user
moves to the adjacent cells with a higher probability, i.e.,
the transition matrix has a more significant pattern. Finally,
we produced trajectories with 50 timestamps using such
transition matrix to simulate movement of a user.
Quadratic Programming. We use the IBM CPLEX optimizer
[16] (version 12.7.1) to find the globally optimal solution
for the quadratic programming in Algorithm 2. We adopt
a strategy of conservative release as mentioned previously
and limit the computation time for each optimization to 1
second.
EVENTS. We investigate PRESENCE and PATTERN events,
which are represented by two parameters S and T . For
example, PRESENCE(S = {1 : 10}, T = [4 : 8]) is PRESENCE event
denoting the user appears in the region of {s1, s2, · · · , s10}
during timestamps {4, 5, 6, 7, 8}.
Utility Metrics. We use two metrics to evaluate data utility.
• Privacy budget α used in PLM, including α at each
timestamp (see Section 5.2) and the average α during
the whole time period (see Section 5.3). A higher
privacy budget indicates higher utility.
• The Euclidean distance between the perturbed lo-
cations and the true locations. A smaller Euclidean
distance indicates higher utility.
We run our algorithm 100 times and aggregate the results to
calculate average privacy budget and Euclidean distance.
5.2 Utility at Each Timestamp
In this section, we show the utility (average privacy
budget over 100 runs) at each timestamp for protecting
PRESENCE(S = [1 : 10], T = [4 : 8]) and PRESENCE(S = [1 : 10], T =
[16 : 20]).
PriSTE with Geo-indistinguishability. In Fig.8(a), it
turns out that, 0.2-PLM satisfies 1-spatiotemporal event
privacy with only slight privacy budget reduction, and
satisfies 0.5-spatiotemporal event privacy with few budget
reduction, but need to reduce more privacy budgets (to
be stricter) in order to achieve 0.1-spatiotemporal event
privacy. Similar results can be observed in Fig.8(b) and
Fig.9. We also observe that the standard deviation is larger
for weaker LPPMs since these privacy budgets need to
be frequently calibrated. Hence, we can conclude that a
stricter PLM for location privacy can protect spatiotemporal
event without much calibration, but a more loose PLM
may need to reduce its privacy budget significantly for -
spatiotemporal event privacy.
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Fig. 8: PRESENCE(S = [1 : 10], T = [4 : 8]) on synthetic data.
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Fig. 9: PRESENCE(S = [1 : 10], T = [16 : 20]) on synthetic data.
Comparing Fig.8 with Fig.9, where the events are de-
fined on time periods 4∼8 and 16∼20 respectively, we can
see that privacy budgets tend to be reduced during the
defined time periods. This indicates that the final α used
by PLM at each timestamp may disclose the definition of
spatiotemporal event as we discussed in Section 4.3. Hence,
a local model is needed for PriSTE framework.
Protecting multiple events. Fig.10 depicts the utilities
when protecting two events sequentially using Algorithm 2.
We can see that the utility is much worse than protecting
each single event in Fig.8 or Fig.9 because the algorithm
needs to simultaneously check if -spatiotemporal event pri-
vacy is satisfied for both events at each time. If no perturbed
location satisfying the privacy requirement of both events
simultaneously, the algorithm needs to halve the privacy
budget until finding an appropriate output.
PriSTE with δ-Location Set Privacy. In Fig.11, we show
the utility of PriSTE with LPPMs that satisfy δ-Location
Set Privacy (Algorithm 3). Comparing Fig.11 with Fig.8,
although both of them are using 0.2-PLM, the essential
difference between them is the privacy metric: the former
satisfies δ-location set privacy and the latter satisfies geo-
indistinguishability, i.e., 0.2-PLM in Fig.11 has a constrained
output domain. We can see that such 0.2-PLM in Fig.11 has
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Fig. 10: Protecting two events PRESENCE(S = [1 : 10], T = [4 : 8])
and PRESENCE(S = [1 : 10], T = [16 : 20]) on synthetic data.
to reduce more privacy budgets to achieve -spatiotemporal
event privacy. Intuitively, it is because the privacy metric of
δ-location set privacy implies a weaker privacy guarantee
and its LPPM has to be stricter (using a smaller privacy
budget) for protecting the event.
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privacy for different .
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Fig. 11: PRESENCE(S = [1 : 10], T = [4 : 8]) on synthetic data.
5.3 Utility over Timestamps
In this section, we demonstrate the utility against different
factors on the Geolife data and synthetic data. Figures 12
and 13 are for protecting PRESENCE event. Due to space lim-
itation, the results of protecting PATTERN event are included
in Appendices. Different from the utility in previous section
which is averaged at each time, this section displays the
utility that is further averaged over timestamps. Hence, in
the left parts of Figures 12 and 13 (ave. budget), the steeper
lines indicate the budget may be reduced heavily at some
timestamps. Generally, the utility increases with a larger 
in Fig.12 and Fig.13.
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Fig. 12: PRESENCE(S = [1 : 10], T = [4 : 8]) on Geolife data.
Utility vs. α-geo-indistinguishability. In Fig.12, we can
see that a larger α-PLM needs to be calibrated heavily (i.e.,
steeper) for a small . Interestingly, PLMs with larger aver-
age budgets (in the left figures) may not necessarily have
better utility in terms of Euclidean distance. For example,
at  = 0.5, the Euclidean distance of 5-PLM and 3-PLM are
very close; at  = 1 or 2, 0.5-PLM and 1-PLM appear to have
almost the same Euclidean distance. The reason is that PLMs
that have larger average budgets may have extremely small
budgets at some timestamps, which results in the higher
average Euclidean distance over timestamps.
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Fig. 13: PRESENCE(S = [1 : 10], T = [4 : 8]) on Geolife data (0.5-PLM
with δ-location set privacy).
Utility vs. δ-location set privacy. In Fig.13, we can see
that a PLM with a larger δ tends to have a smaller average
budget. It is because the PLM with a larger δ indicates a
weaker privacy metric. Hence, the PLM needs to be stricter
(i.e, a small budget) to achieve spatiotemporal event privacy.
However, such PLM may have a better utility in terms of
Euclidean distance as shown in right figure of Fig.13. The
reason is that δ-location set privacy with a larger δ restricts
the output domain significantly, which makes perturbed
location close to the true location with a high probability.
The results are in line with the main purpose of δ-location
set privacy: to have a better trade off between utility and
privacy.
Utility vs. Transition Matrices. We compare the utility
against transition matrices that have different strength of
mobility patterns. As we explained previously, a smaller σ
indicates a more significant mobility pattern. Fig.14 shows
that, for the same LPPM, it is hard to protect a spatiotem-
poral event if user’s mobility pattern is significant, i.e., the
LPPM needs to be very strict by using a small privacy
budget. We also observe that there is no best LPPM for
all -spatiotemporal event privacy in terms of Euclidean
distance.
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Fig. 14: PRESENCE(S = [1 : 10], T = [4 : 8]) on synthetic data (1-PLM
with geo-indistinguishability).
5.4 Runtime
We name the size of T and the size of S as event length
and event width, respectively. We also report the performance
evaluation on conservative release described in Section 4.3.
Runtime vs. Event Length. We fix the event width as 5
and test 100 random events with length ranging from 5 to
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15. Fig.15 shows that the average runtime of the baseline is
exponential to event length and the runtime of our method
is linear to the event length.
Runtime vs. Event Width. We fix the event length as 5
and test 100 random events with width ranging from 5 to
15. Fig.15 shows that the average runtime of the baseline
is exponential to the event width, while our method is
polynomial to the event width, which is in line with the
complexity of O(m3).
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Fig. 15: Runtime evaluation.
Runtime vs. Conservative Release. In Line 16 of Algorithm
2, we set a threshold runtime in solving the quadratic
program. We do not release the perturbed location unless
we are sure that Eq.(15) and Eq.(16) are true. The threshold
is a trade-off between runtime and utility as shown in
Table 3 among 100 runs. We note that each runtime in
Table 3 includes the whole process of Algorithm 2. In our
implementation, we set the threshold to 1 second. We can
see as the threshold increases, the number of conservative
releases decreases, which results in increasing runtime. On
the other hand, the calibrated privacy budgets increasse as
the threshold increases. This verifies the tradeoff between
runtime and utility that can be achieved by the conservative
release.
threshold
(s)
ave. total
runtime
(s)
# of Con-
servative
Release
ave.
privacy
budget
ave.
Euclidean
dist. (km)
0.01 1.1 33 0.16 2.22
0.1 2.6 30 0.23 1.51
1 5.9 21 0.22 1.52
2 10.4 12 0.29 0.93
5 19.5 8 0.27 1.41
none 52.5 0 0.31 0.97
TABLE 3: Runtime vs. threshold.
6 RELATED WORKS
6.1 Location Privacy Preserving Mechanisms
The LPPMs [8] [11] [21] [22] [23] [24] generally use some
obfuscation methods, like spatial cloaking, cell merging,
location precision reduction or dummy cells, to manipulate
the probability distribution of users’ locations. As differ-
ential privacy becomes a standard for privacy protection,
[8] proposed a Geo-indistinguishability notion based on
differential privacy and a planar Laplace mechanism to
achieve it. Xiao et al. [11] [19] studied how to protect location
privacy under temporal correlations with an optimal dif-
ferentially private mechanism. Rodriguez-Carrion et al. [25]
also studied the effect of temporal dependencies on entropy-
based location privacy metric. They proposed a new privacy
metric entropy rate and perturbative mechanisms based on
it, which can be an alternative LPPM in our framework for
protecting spatiotemporal event privacy. Several studies [26]
[27] [28] [?] [29] [30] tried to achieve an optimal trade-off
between the utility of applications and the privacy guar-
antee in the LPPMs. Overall, above works all focused on
the mechanisms of location privacy, which can be used in
our framework as given LPPMs. Whereas we study a new
problem of spatiotemporal event privacy.
6.2 Inferences on Location
Various inference attacks can be carried out based on loca-
tion information and external information such as moving
patterns. In the aggregated setting, recent works have stud-
ied location or trajectory recovery attacks from aggregated
location data [6] [31] or proximity query results from lo-
cation data [4]. We mainly discuss the individual setting
that is closely related to our work. Studies [26] [32] [33]
[34] investigated the question of how to formally quantify
the privacy of existing LPPMs, given an adversary who
can model users’ mobility using a Markov process learned
from population. Liao et al. [35] used a hierarchical Markov
model to learn and infer a user’s trajectory based on the
places and temporal patterns they visited. Qiao et al. [36]
used the Continuous Time Bayesian Networks to predict
uncertain trajectories of moving objects. Li et al. [37] uses
frequent mining approach to find moving objects that move
within arbitrary shape of clusters for certain timestamps that
are possibly nonconsecutive.
7 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we investigate a new type of pivacy goal:
protecting spatiotemporal event, which has not been studied
in literature. We formally define spatiotemporal events and
design a privacy metric extending the notion of differential
privacy. We proposed PriSTE, a framework integrating an
LPPM for protecting the spatiotemporal event privacy. An
interesting direction is to find optimal way for achieving
both location privacy and spatiotemporal event privacy. An-
other question is how we can design a generic mechanism
for spatiotemporal event privacy.
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APPENDIX A
PROOFS
A.1 Proof of Lemma 3.2
Proof. At timestamps 1, α1 = [pi, 0] ◦ p˜o1 . For t > 1, αt =
α1M1p˜Do2 · · ·Mt−1p˜
D
ot
= [pi, 0]
(
p˜Do1
∏t
i=2(Mi−1p˜
D
oi
)
)
. By Lemma
3.1, Pr(EVENT, o1, o2, · · · , ot) = αt
∏end−1
i=t Mi[0, 1]
ᵀ. Then Equa-
tion (13) can be derived.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 3.3
Proof. Pr(o1, o2, · · · , ot, EVENT is true) = ∑k Pr (lend =
k, o1, o2, · · · , ot, EVENT is true
)
. By forward-backward algo-
rithm, Pr(lt = sk, o1, o2, · · · , ot) = αkt βkt . Thus we only need
to derive the αend and βend and compute the sum of
αend◦βend in the world where the EVENT is true. By Lemma
3.2, αend = [pi, 0]
(
p˜Do1
∏end
i=2(Mi−1p˜
D
oi
)
)
. By backward algo-
rithm, βend = [1, 1]
∏end
i=t−1(p˜
D
oi+1
Mᵀi ) with βt = [1, 1]. Thus
Pr(EVENT, o1, o2, · · · , ot) = (αend ◦ βend)[0, 1]ᵀ = αend(βend ◦
[0, 1])ᵀ, which is equal to Equation (14).
A.3 Proof of Theorem 4.1
Proof Sketch. By Definition 2.4, it is equivalent to prove
f1(pi) ≤ 0 and f2(pi) ≤ 0 where f1(pi) = Pr(o1,o2,··· ,oT ,EVENT)Pr(EVENT) −
e Pr(o1,o2,··· ,oT ,¬EVENT)
Pr(¬EVENT) and f2(pi) =
Pr(o1,o2,··· ,oT ,¬EVENT)
Pr(¬EVENT) −
e Pr(o1,o2,··· ,oT ,EVENT)
Pr(EVENT) . By Lemma 3.1 and 3.3, Theorem 4.1
can be derived.
APPENDIX B
NAIVE SOLUTIONS
B.1 Computing Prior Probability of an Event
Considering an event is a set of Boolean expression of (loca-
tion, time) predicates combined with AND and OR, a naive
approach would be to enumerate all possible cases for the
event and sum (correspond to OR) the product (correspond
to AND) of the probabilities of each location predicate and
such an approach would require exponential computation
time. Due to space limitation, we omit a detailed algorithm
for this naive solution. Instead, we show an example as
below.
1 time2 3 4 5 6
Pattern
s1
s2
s3
Fig. 16: Pr(PATTERN) =
∑
Pr(all trajectories rendering PATTERN)
for the 24 trajectories satisfying the PATTERN event defined above.
Example B.1. In Fig.16, a PATTERN event is defined by the
shaded regions during timestamp 2 to 5. Thus start = 2, end =
5. The regions are s2 = [1, 1, 0]ᵀ, s3 = [0, 1, 1]ᵀ, s4 = [1, 1, 0]ᵀ,
s5 = [0, 1, 1]ᵀ. To derive the probability of one trajectory, e.g. the
solid lines in Fig.16, it would be Pr(l2 = s1)∗Pr(l3 = s2|l2 = s1)∗
Pr(l4 = s1|l3 = s2, l2 = s1)∗Pr(l5 = s1|l4 = s1, l3 = s2, l2 = s1).
Because there are 24 trajectories for the PATTERN event, the prior
probability of PATTERN, i.e., Pr(PATTERN) is the sum of 24 such
probabilities.
B.2 Computing Join Probability of an Event
Algorithm 4 Naive Algorithm to Derive the Joint Probability
of a PATTERN
Require: M, pstart−1: the probability at timestamp start− 1, p˜ot , PATTERN in
timestamp start, · · · , end
ppattern ← 0
for traj in PATTERN do . exponential trajectories
ptraj ← (pstart−1M) ◦ p˜ot
ptraj = ptraj [lstart in traj]
for t in {start+ 1, · · · , end} do
st−1 ← lt−1 in traj
st ← lt in traj
ptraj ← ptraj ∗mst−1st ∗ p˜ot [st]
end for
ppattern ← ppattern + ptraj
end for
Let traj be a trajectory of the PATTERN. There will be
|traj| trajectories of the PATTERN. For example, in Figure 16,
the solid line is traj = {l2 = s1, l3 = s2, l4 = s1, l5 = s2},
which means l2 in traj is s1, · · · , l5 in traj is s2. Let M be
the transition matrix where mij is the transition probability
from state i to state j. p˜ot denotes the emission proba-
bility of observing ot, p˜ot = [Pr(ot|lt = s1),Pr(ot|lt =
s2), · · · ,Pr(ot|lt = sm)]. Thus p˜ot [s1] = Pr(ot|lt = s1), · · · ,
p˜ot [sm] = Pr(ot|lt = sm). Let Pr(ostart, · · · , oend, traj) be
the joint probability of the observations and the trajectory.
Then Pr(traj|ostart, · · · , oend) = Pr(ostart,··· ,oend,traj)Pr(ostart,··· ,oend) . Thus
we focus on the joint probability Pr(ostart, · · · , oend, traj).
Setup. Let start = 2, pstart−1 = pi. For a given pi, Al-
gorithm 4 can be used to derive the joint probability of a
PATTERN. The runtime can be compared with the runtime
of Equation (13), which is also the joint probability.
Note that to derive Equation (13), we prefer “vec-
tor*matrix” instead of “matrix*matrix” for efficiency. Cal-
culate it from left to right so that no matrix multiplication
should be conducted.
APPENDIX C
EXAMPLES
C.1 An Example of Prior Probability Computation
We use an example to describe the details in computation.
Example C.1 (Prior Probability Computation). Let us con-
sider the computation of Example 3.1. For the PRESENCE event
defined at t = 3 and t = 4, the transition matrix at t = 2 and
t = 3 derived by Equation (4) is the left matrix below; while the
transition matrix at t = 1 and t ≥ 4 derived by Equation (5) is
the right matrix below.
0 0 0.7 0.1 0.2 0
0 0 0.5 0.4 0.1 0
0 0 0.9 0 0.1 0
0 0 0 0.1 0.2 0.7
0 0 0 0.4 0.1 0.5
0 0 0 0 0.1 0.9


0.1 0.2 0.7 0 0 0
0.4 0.1 0.5 0 0 0
0 0.1 0.9 0 0 0
0 0 0 0.1 0.2 0.7
0 0 0 0.4 0.1 0.5
0 0 0 0 0.1 0.9

(23)
M2,M3 M1,M4,M5
Thus by Lemma 3.1, Pr(PRESENCE) = [pi, 0]M1M2M3[0, 1]ᵀ,
which is a function of pi as Pr(PRESENCE) = pi[0.28, 0.298, 0.226]ᵀ.
